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The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury."' This constitutional guarantee derives
from the traditional English institution of the grand jury, which English
settlers brought to the American colonies.2 Originally used to aid the
Crown in detecting and prosecuting crimes, the English grand jury came
to be perceived as a shield for the accused against baseless accusations.3
Thus, in the American colonies, the grand jury often thwarted the
Crown's efforts to enforce unpopular laws and to prosecute those chal-
lenging its authority.4 Against this background, the Framers incorpo-
rated the requirement of indictment by grand jury into the Bill of Rights.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the transplanted English institution
theoretically serves "as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons
accused of public offences upon just grounds, but also as a means of pro-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger" are excepted from the requirement. Id.
2. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND
JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:03, at 12 (1986). For a concise and thorough treatment of the histor-
ical development of the American grand jury, see id. §§ 1:01-:06, and M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS,
THE GRAND JURY 6-17 (1977).
3. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 1:02, at 7-9; M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS,
supra note 2, at 9-10. As one writer of the period remarked, the grand jury's function had become
[t]o preserve the Innocent from the Disgrace and Hazards which ill Men may design to
bring them to, out of Malice, or through Subornation, or other sinister Ends; for so tender
is the Law, of the Reputation and Life of a Man, that it will not suffer the one to be sullied
•.. and the other indangered by a Trial, until first the Matter and Evidence against him
have been scann'd, examined, and found by a Grand Jury, upon their Oaths, against him.
H. CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 252 (4th ed. 1719),
quoted in 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 1:02, at 9.
4. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 1:03, at 13 (noting refusal to indict "for crimes
involving resistance to British authority"); M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at 11-12
(noting refusal to indict either leaders of riot against Stamp Act or publisher who criticized colony's
governor); Vaira, The Role of the Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury Room: Where Is the Foul Line?,
75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1984).
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tecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from
government, or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity." 5
The American grand jury is thought to act as an independent entity,
free from both judicial and executive control.6 Respect for this indepen-
dence, and also for the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings, has
restricted the scope of federal judicial review of such proceedings. 7 The
Court has stated that the American grand jury, like its English antece-
dent, is "not [to be] hampered by rigid procedural or evidential rules."'8
Moreover, excessive judicial supervision of prosecutorial conduct before
the grand jury could infringe executive branch prerogatives, creating sep-
aration of powers problems. 9 Courts have therefore hesitated to review
prosecutors' actions before grand juries. This institutional restraint, cou-
pled with the prosecutors' dominant role in grand jury proceedings, cre-
ates an environment susceptible to prosecutorial overreaching.
Prosecutors effectively control grand jury proceedings by selecting
the matters and individuals under investigation, directing the interroga-
tion of witnesses, serving as legal advisor to the process, and drafting
indictments for the grand jury's imprimatur. 10 Moreover, individuals
who appear before a grand jury have no right to the presence of counsel
5. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887), quoted with approval in Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 218 n.3 (1960); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962):
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society
of standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether a charge is
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal
ill will.
6. See, e.g., Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218 ("The very purpose of the requirement that a man be
indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens
acting independently of either prosecuting attorney orjudge." (emphasis added)); Costello, 350 U.S. at
362; United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); see
also 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:18 (scope ofjudicial review of grand jury proceed-
ings restricted in light of traditional independence of grand jury); 1 id. § 1:04 (historical view).
7. See generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:18 (discussing judicial review of
grand jury proceedings).
8. Costello, 350 U.S. at 362; see also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) ("the
scope of [the grand jury's] inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety").
9. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank
of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988); United States v. De Rosa, 783 F.2d 1401,
1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1283
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985); see also 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2,
§ 10:18 (separation of powers limits judicial authority to supervise prosecutors' conduct).
Courts' unwillingness to interfere with the grand jury's investigative and law enforcement func-
tions also tends to restrict the scope of review of prosecutors' conduct. Id. § 10:18, at 63 (citing
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974)). This concern arises primarily in appeals filed
during an ongoing grand jury proceeding. Id.
10. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFALIS, supra note 2, at 2; B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MIS-
CONDUCT § 2.1, at 2-2 (1987); Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury
Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1079 (1984).
1243
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:1242
during their interrogation."1 This situation gives prosecutors considera-
ble opportunity to abuse the grand jury process.12
The range of potential abuse matches the breadth of prosecutors'
powers.' 3 Possible acts of prosecutorial misconduct include making in-
flammatory or prejudicial remarks about the accused,' 4 stating personal
views in order to undermine the grand jury's independence,' 5 testifying
before the grand jury,16 interfering with the grand jury's deliberations or
voting,' 7 and knowingly presenting false or perjured evidence or failing
to take corrective measures after discovering the falsity of evidence.' 8
11. 1 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 6:16, at 88. Witnesses, however, may periodi-
cally consult with counsel outside the grand jury room. Id. They may also assert some evidentiary
privileges. Id. §§ 6:21, at 128 (spousal, marital-communication, doctor-patient, and clergyman-com-
municant privileges), 6:22, at 132 (privilege against self-incrimination), 6:23, at 141 (attorney-client
privilege).
12. As Judge Learned Hand remarked in his dissent in United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d
567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954), "[slave for torture, it would be hard to find a
more effective tool of tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination."
Id. at 573 (L. Hand, J., dissenting); see also B. GERSHMAN, supra note 10, § 2.1, at 2-3, § 2.3, at 2-
12. Of course, the grand jurors themselves provide an inherent check against the most extreme
forms of prosecutorial misconduct; they can always, by returning a "no bill," refuse to indict.
13. See generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, §§ 10:01-:12 (discussing various
forms of misconduct); B. GERSHMAN, supra note 10, §§ 2.3-.4, 2.6-.9 (same); Note, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 134-35 (1987) (citing and discussing types of misconduct); Note, supra
note 10, at 1081 n.36 (cataloguing misconduct and illustrative cases).
As used in this Note, the term "prosecutorial grand jury misconduct" refers to acts by a prose-
cutor that violate a judge-made or statutory rule designed to protect the integrity and independence
of grand juries.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) (prosecutor presented
speculative hearsay about defendant's involvement in murders not under investigation by grand
jury); United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir.) (prosecutor intimidated witness
and insinuated that targets of investigation would harm witness), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937, 444 U.S.
944, 444 U.S. 983 (1979); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 814-17 (3d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor
commented on veracity of witnesses and alleged, without foundation, that defendant had links to
organized crime).
15. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.) (prosecutor expressed
opinions on witness credibility and told grand jurors that all prosecutors signed indictment because
prosecutors felt it was warranted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959, 963-64 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (prosecutor
testified before grand jury).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 314-15 (D. Idaho 1908) (district attorney
commented on evidence, explained law, and applied it to facts during grand jury deliberations).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1983) (false testimony by
DEA agents); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor, learning that
witness perjured testimony, informed opposing counsel but not court or grand jury).
Prosecutors also use the grand jury for such improper purposes as collecting evidence for civil
investigations or pending criminal prosecutions, or harrassing individuals or groups. See 2 S. BEALE
& W. BRYSON, supra note 2, §§ 10:13-:17; see also M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, at
52-59 (expressing concern with use of grand jury to oppress radical and nonconformist groups and
invade witnesses' first amendment rights). These abuses, however, do not affect grand juries' indict-
ment decisions, the focal point of this Note.
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Misconduct might also involve violations of procedural rules designed to
protect both the target and the general integrity of the deliberative
process.19
Over the years, some federal appellate courts, in an effort to redress
or deter flagrant prosecutorial misconduct before grand juries, have dis-
missed indictments even after a defendant's conviction. 20 Now, however,
if a defendant moves for such a dismissal and a district court denies the
defendant's motion or takes it under advisement, a petit jury's guilty ver-
dict may insulate the district court's ruling from meaningful appellate
review; under the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mechanik, 21 a verdict of guilty confirms a grand jury's finding of prob-
able cause to indict.
In Mechanik the Supreme Court held that a guilty verdict mooted
the question whether a grand jury indictment that resulted from simulta-
neous testimony of two government witnesses-a clear violation of Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d)-was tainted.22 The Court
reasoned that although the presence of more than one witness might have
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, the trial jury's guilty ver-
dict removed any doubt about the existence of probable cause. 23 The
guilty verdict thus rendered harmless any error resulting from the trial
court's failure to dismiss the indictment because of the Rule 6(d)
violation. 24
In the aftermath of Mechanik, appellate courts have generally dis-
missed postconviction appeals that allege prosecutorial misconduct in
19. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (1988) (misconduct
included violations of Rules 6(d) (unauthorized person in grand jury room) and 6(e) (secrecy of
proceedings)).
20. E.g., Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761-62 (dismissal warranted where prosecutor presented extensive
hearsay and depicted accused as "hoodlum" who should be indicted as a "matter of equity"); see 2 S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, §§ 10:22, at 88-93, 10:23, at 103.
21. 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986).
22. Id. at 70. Rule 6(d) provides:
WHO MAY BE PRESENT. Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination,
interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or
operator of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no
person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
23. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70-71.
24. Id. at 73. Before Mechanik, courts often held that anything more than a fleeting "unau-
thorized presence" required automatic dismissal. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 15.6, at 332 (1984). The Supreme Court saw "no reason" not to subject grand jury
violations to harmless error analysis under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), which provides: "Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
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grand jury proceedings.25 Mechanik's harmless error analysis is troub-
ling to some, however, because it may insulate prosecutorial misconduct
before grand juries from postconviction appellate review.26 This prospect
of unreviewability has prompted some courts (at least in dicta) to inter-
pret the Supreme Court's holding narrowly. 27 The issue has also at-
tracted congressional attention.28 In addition, the Mechanik decision has
25. Dismissed appeals of this type have included United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 582-
83 (2d Cir. 1988) (Rule 6(e) violation), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Lazar v. United States, 57
U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1988) (No. 88-250); United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 732-33
(4th Cir. 1988) (grand jury foreman not qualified to serve); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825,
831-32 (1st Cir.) (appeal on grounds of prosecutor's failure to impeach allegedly perjured testimony
or to present exculpatory evidence; inflaming of grand jury by suggesting that irrelevant, noncrimi-
nal conduct was wrongful), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 117 (1988); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d
509, 514-15 (7th Cir.) (failing to present exculpatory evidence and misleading grand jury about
weight of evidence), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988); United States v. Tobias, 836 F.2d 449, 452
(9th Cir. 1988) (denial of request for grand jury records for purposes of verifying whether grand jury
was properly constituted and whether quorum existed); United States v. MeKie, 831 F.2d 819, 820-
21 (8th Cir. 1987) (improper reference to previous convictions); United States v. Kouba, 822 F.2d
768, 773-74 (8th Cir. 1987) (misleading summaries of testimony; calling witnesses in order to have
them invoke fifth amendment before grand jury; misconduct of government agent in connection with
grand jury investigation); United States v. Hintzman, 806 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1986) (hearsay
evidence misleadingly presented; biased witness); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 941-42 (11th
Cir. 1986) (grand juror related to victim of alleged crime; prosecutor failed to disclose relationship),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3195, 3196 (1987); United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.)
(improper questions; failure to present exculpatory evidence; generally misleading and improperly
advising grand jury), cert denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986).
26. See Arkin, Mechanik-A Year Later, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Curran &
Margolius, Many Remedies Exist to Address Prosecutorial-Misconduct Claims, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 13,
1987, at 28, col. 1,
27. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1988) (harmless error analy-
sis inapplicable where issue is violation of right to fundamental fairness); United States v. Midland
Asphalt Corp., 840 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (2d Cir.) (error involving Rule 6(e) violation will not be
rendered harmless by conviction under Mechanik), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988) (No. 87-
1905); United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1986) (same); cf United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 1987) (some error involving extremely egregious
misconduct might escape harmless error analysis).
28. Legislation to specifically overrule Mechanik was introduced in the 99th and 100th Con-
gresses. Eg., H.R. 3308, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced, 133 CONG. REc. H7735 (daily ed. Sept.
21, 1987) [hereinafter H.R. 100-3308]. The bill would have created the following new 18 U.S.C.
§ 3322:
(a) GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL-The court shall dismiss an indictment if the court finds a
substantial failure to comply with the law governing the grand jury proceedings out of
which such indictment arose.
(b) WHEN MOTION MAY BE MADE; Esi'cr OF INTERVENING VERDiCr.-A motion
made under this section may be made at any time before, or, for good cause shown during,
or after, trial. A verdict of guilty at trial does not affect the availability or determination of
such motion.
H.R. 100-3308, supra, see. 2(a), 3322(a)-(b).
Proponents of the bill characterized Mechanik as "an open invitation for prosecutors to disre-
gard grand jury procedures" that undermines Congress's authority to enact rules for the federal
courts because it "permit[s] prosecutors to violate these rules with no fear of enforceable sanctions."
Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1407 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 309-10 (1986) [hereinafter
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raised the question whether defendants may bring interlocutory appeals
for denials of their motions to dismiss.29
This Note evaluates the judicial approaches to prosecutorial grand
jury misconduct that have developed following the Supreme Court's de-
cision. First, the Note discusses Mechanik itself. It then considers in
part II whether the decision's harmless error analysis justifies interlocu-
tory review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. In part III, the Note
discusses the broader implications of Mechanik's holding for the appel-
late courts' role in supervising prosecutorial conduct before federal grand
juries. The Note concludes that a fair reading of Mechanik virtually
eliminates appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct that affects
grand jury charging decisions. The historically strict application of the
final judgment rule in cases of interlocutory criminal appeals allows no
pre-judgment review of a prosecutor's actions, and the rationale of
Mechanik, especially in light of other recent decisions, prevents circum-
vention of the harmless error rule in postconviction appeals.
I. UNITED STATES V. MECHANIK
The lower Mechanik courts focused on the question whether, to se-
cure dismissal of an indictment that involves a Rule 6(d) violation, a
Hearings on H.R. 1407] (remarks of Rep. Edwards). Originally proposed as H.R. 5367, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., introduced, 132 CONG. REc. H5773 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1986), the measure was not enacted
during the 99th Congress. It was introduced in March 1987 as H.R. 1348, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
introduced, 133 CONG. REc. H934 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1987), and reintroduced with minor changes on
September 21, 1987, as H.R. 100-3308, supra, see 133 CONG. REc. H7735 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
H.R. 100-3308 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, where it died at the end of the
100th Congress.
Testimony at the hearings on the 1986 bill focused on the need to preserve the integrity of the
grand jury process, rather than on the rights of individual defendants. See Hearings on HR. 1407,
supra, at 316 (statement of Bernard S. Bailor, Vice-Chairperson, ABA White Collar Crime Commit-
tee); id. at 336 (testimony of Henry Scott Wallace, Legislative Director, National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers). As Mr. Wallace stated:
The question that confronts this subcommittee in this legislation is not whether ... a
defendant should be rewarded for having become the victim of some lapse before the grand
jury, but whether the grand jury should have the continuing benefit of [the] protections
that are contained in [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 6 and perhaps those contained
in the Constitution as well.
Id. Had Congress enacted the bill, it would have implicitly rejected the balance of interests struck
by Justice Rehnquist in his Mechanik opinion. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
29. See, eg., United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216, 218-22 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding ap-
peal premature); United States v. Kirk, No. 88-5660 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10244) (dismissing pre-conviction appeal); Johns, 858 F.2d at 159 (dismissing appeal);
United States v. Daniels, 848 F.2d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding appeal premature); Midland
Asphalt, 840 F.2d at 1045-46 (dismissing appeal); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d
250, 253 (lst Cir. 1987) (dismissing appeal); United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir.




defendant must show actual prejudice. In the course of the pretrial pro-
ceedings in Mechanik, the grand jury issued one indictment and then a
second, superseding indictment for violations of federal drug enforce-
ment laws and for conspiracy. 30 The Rule 6(d) violation occurred during
the government's presentation of additional evidence for the superseding
indictment: two federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents testi-
fied simultaneously, taking turns and occasionally interrupting one an-
other to indicate the criminal count applicable to the other's testimony.31
The district court took the defendants' motion to dismiss under advise-
ment.32 After the petit jury returned a guilty verdict, the court found
that, the agents' testimony aside, adequate evidence supported the super-
seding indictment; it therefore held that the agents' testimony did not
prejudice the defendants and denied the defendants' motion. 33 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, however,
reasoning that to require prejudice would undermine Rule 6(d)'s assur-
ance "that grand jurors, sitting without the direct supervision of a judge,
are not subject to undue influence that may come with the presence of an
unauthorized person."'3 4
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court suggested that a
defendant could never show sufficient prejudice to prevail in light of a
subsequent conviction. 35 Writing for a divided court, then-Associate Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that Rule 6(d) "protects against the danger that a
defendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is
no probable cause to believe him guilty."' 36 Conceding that the Rule 6(d)
violation could have influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,37 Jus-
tice Rehnquist focused on the relevance of that influence in light of the
petit jury's verdict:
[T]he . . .subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was
probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged,
30. See United States v. Lill, 511 F. Supp. 50, 52-53 (S.D. W. Va. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. United States v. Mechanik, 735 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd en bancper curiam,
756 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rey'd in part, 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 51.
33. Id. at 58-61. The district court thus refused to apply the pre-Mechanik "per se" rule of
dismissal employed in several circuits. This rule conclusively presumed prejudice to the target in
cases involving violations of, for example, Rule 6(d), even though such violations had had an uncer-
tain impact on grand jury deliberations. See id. at 58 (collecting cases involving Rule 6(d) viola-
tions); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.6 (discussing Rule 6(d) violations).
34. Mechanik, 735 F.2d at 139.
35. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 71 ("[R]eversal of a conviction after a trial free from reversible error
cannot restore to the defendant whatever benefit might have accrued to him from a trial on an
indictment returned in conformity with Rule 6(d).").




but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.... [A]ny error in the grand jury proceeding connected with
the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 8
In other words, the guilty verdict "demonstrate[d] a fortiori" that the
grand jury had probable cause to issue its indictment.39
Justice Rehnquist did note that, since Rule 6(d) guards against
tainted grand jury charging decisions, indictments arguably should be
compared to the evidence presented to the grand jury, rather than to the
petit jury at trial.40 He dismissed this argument easily, however, stating
that a reversal would not restore Rule 6(d) protections to a defendant
who has already endured trial: "He will already have suffered whatever
inconvenience, expense, and opprobrium that a proper indictment may
have spared him. In courtroom proceedings as elsewhere, 'the moving
finger writes; and, having writ, moves on.' ",41
In the balance of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist focused on the costs
of reversing convictions. If a convicted defendant were reindicted, a new
trial would further tax the participants. Moreover, the "[p]assage of
time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses" might fatally
weaken an otherwise strong case; as a result, society might lose its "right
to punish admitted offenders."' 42 Even if the second trial resulted in con-
viction, that result would not adequately serve society's interest in swift
justice or the ends of deterrence and rehabilitation. 43 Justice Rehnquist
thus concluded that, whatever the merits of reversing a conviction after
an unfair trial, when grand jury error has no influence on a petit jury's
verdict, the costs of reversal outweigh the benefits. 44
38. Id.
39. Id. at 67.
40. Id. at 71.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 72 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982)).
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983)).
44. Id. at 72-73. The Court stated that its decision would not prevent courts from setting aside
convictions without a showing of prejudice in cases of racially biased selection of grand jurors. See
id. at 70 n.1. Justice Rehnquist noted that in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), a case decided
in the same year, setting aside a conviction as a result of such discrimination was "compelled by
precedent directly applicable to the special problem of racial discrimination." Mechanik, 475 U.S. at
70 n.1. As he explained Vasquez,
racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors is so pernicious, and other remedies so
impractical, that the remedy of automatic reversal was necessary as a prophylactic means
of deterring grand jury discrimination in the future, and that one could presume that a
discriminatorily selected grand jury would treat defendants of excluded races unfairly.
Id. (citations omitted).
Rehnquist then distinguished Mechanik from Vasquez:
We think that these considerations have little force outside the context of racial discrimina-
tion in the composition of the grand jury. No long line of precedent requires the setting
aside of a conviction based on a rule violation in the antecedent grand jury proceedings,
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Although the appellate courts have applied Mechanik to dismiss a
variety of postconviction appeals involving prosecutorial grand jury mis-
conduct, they have reached disparate conclusions about the scope and
impact of the Mechanik decision. 45 Some have heard interlocutory ap-
peals of asserted grand jury errors, reasoning that Mechanik forecloses
effective posteonviction review.46 Others have asse:ted that Mechanik,
despite its absolute language, does not require a postconviction finding of
harmless error in cases involving especially flagrant, widespread, or egre-
gious prosecutorial misconduct. 47
In its aftermath, then, Mechanik raises two interrelated questions.
First, if the decision forecloses postconviction appellate review of mo-
tions to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct, can a defendant challenge
a district court's denial of such a motion before a verdict? Second, after
Mechanik, can an appellate court review denials of motions that allege
especially egregious prosecutorial misconduct? The most thorough judi-
cial treatment of these questions has occurred in the context of pre-judg-
ment appeals in which a conviction has not yet triggered Mechanik's
harmless error rule.48 The next part reviews the federal final judgment
rule and collateral order doctrine in the criminal context and considers
how these doctrines affect the validity of recent judicial treatment of in-
terlocutory appeals involving prosecutorial grand jury misconduct.
II. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS OF GRAND JURY ERROR
AFTER MECHANIK
A. The Final Judgment Rule and the Collateral Order Doctrine.
Under the final judgment rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1291,
federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only the final deci-
sions of district courts.49 As the "dominant rule" governing federal ap-
pellate procedure, 0 the final judgment rule reinforces the authority of
district courts, curbs undue harassment of opponents, and promotes the
and the societal interest in deterring this sort of error does not rise to the level of the
interest in deterring racial discrimination.
Id.
45. See infra notes 106-31 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 812 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing interlocutory
appeal).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1988) (dismissing interlocutory
appeal because claim of egregious prosecutorial misconduct would be reviewable after conviction).
48. See infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
50. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 270 (1984) (quoting DiBella v. United States, 369
U.S. 121, 126 (1962)); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940) ("Finality as a
condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure."), quoted with ap-
proval in Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263.
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efficient administration of justice.5 1
The rule, however, is not absolute. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., a 1949 civil case, the Supreme Court gave the rule a "practi-
cal rather than a technical construction. '5 2 As the Court noted, 28
U.S.C. section 1292, which confers jurisdiction over interlocutory ap-
peals in certain civil contexts, 53 "indicate[s Congress's] purpose to allow
appeals from orders other than final judgments when they have a final
and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties."' 54 In recognizing this
exception to the final judgment rule, the Court created the federal collat-
eral order doctrine. 5  As restated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the
doctrine imposes three requirements: to qualify as an immediately re-
viewable collateral order, a district court ruling must "conclusively de-
termine the disputed question[,] . . . resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action[,] and ... be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. '56
Despite its "practical" application of the final judgment rule in civil
cases, the Court has strictly adhered to the policy of finality in the crimi-
nal context.5 7 In this context, "final judgment" generally means convic-
51. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263-64; see also Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326 (for purposes of appel-
late procedure, finality "is the means for achieving a healthy legal system").
52. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The section confers interlocutory jurisdiction in
matters related to injunctions, receiverships, and admiralty cases. Id. § 1292(a). It also provides
jurisdiction over other civil orders when a district court "shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal... may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion . I..." d  § 1292(b).
54. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
55. The Cohen Court held that a district court's order refusing to apply a state security bond
statute in a derivative action was immediately appealable because it was a "final disposition of a
claimed right" entirely distinct from the cause of action. Id. at 546-47. The "Cohen doctrine," as
originally formulated by the Court, allows interlocutory appeal from
that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too in-
dependent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated.
Id. at 546. Technically, the collateral order doctrine represents an expansion of, rather than an
exception to, section 1291: the finality required by the section lies not in the termination of any part
of an action, but in a district court's final determination that materially affects substantive rights.
Collateral orders, however, are considered interlocutory rather than final. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (1976 & Supp. 1988) (discuss-
ing collateral order doctrine).
56. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); accord Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S.
370, 375 (1987) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468 (footnote omitted)); Flanagan v.
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) (stating same three conditions); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981) (same).
57. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 264 (pretrial disqualification of defense counsel not immediately
appealable).
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tion and sentencing.5 8 The Court has emphasized that this policy
promotes society's strong interest in swift resolution of criminal prosecu-
tions, as well as society's interest in judicial economy. 59 Accordingly, it
has allowed appeals before conviction and sentencing in only three types
of criminal cases: those involving bail reduction requests,60 double jeop-
ardy claims,61 and speech or debate clause claims.62
Following this approach, appellate courts have generally dismissed
interlocutory appeals of motions to dismiss for prosecutorial grand jury
misconduct. The courts reasoned that if they allowed pre-judgment re-
view of such claims, the collateral order doctrine would swallow the final
judgment rule. Moreover, at least before Mechanik, orders denying mo-
tions to dismiss did not satisfy the third criterion of the collateral order
58. Id. at 263 (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)).
59. Id. at 264-65. Interrupting a criminal prosecution increases the likelihood that evidence
will deteriorate, adds to the cost of pretrial detention, prolongs the period during which an accused,
at large pending a verdict, might commit other crimes, and increases the delay in healing the
"wound on the community" that crime has inflicted. Id.; see also id. at 264 ("[T]here is a societal
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the
interests of the accused." (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972))); cf United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 863 (1978) (order denying motion to dismiss made on speedy trial
grounds not immediately reviewable).
In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940), Justice Frankfurter succinctly
stated the Court's view on interlocutory appeals in criminal cases:
[The] considerations of policy [reflected in the final judgment rule] are especially compel-
ling in the administration of criminal justice .... An accused is entitled to scrupulous
observance of constitutional safeguards. But encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindi-
cation of the criminal law. Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime
even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship. The correctness
of a trial court's rejection even of a constitutional claim made by the accused in the process
of prosecution must await his conviction before its reconsideration by an appellate tribunal.
60. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
61. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
62. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979).
In Flanagan, the Supreme Court recently reviewed the availability of interlocutory appeal in
criminal cases, holding that any appeal of a pretrial order disqualifying criminal defendants' joint
counsel must await conviction. 465 U.S. at 270. The Court distinguished the case from those in
which it had allowed immediate review by noting that such an appeal based on either the federal due
process clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. V, or the assistance-of-counsel clause, id. amend. VI, is "in no
danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence." 465 U.S. at 266-67. Moreover, unlike an
appeal based on double jeopardy or on the speech or debate clause, the right to due process or to
counsel does not involve a "right not to be tried" in the first instance, but rather, "like virtually all
rights of criminal defendants, merely a right not to be convicted in certain circumstances." Id. at
267 (emphasis added). The right to counsel is in this respect analogous to the right to a speedy trial
or to freedom from vindictive prosecution. Id. at 267 (citing United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S.
850, 860 (1978) (speedy trial right protected by postconviction review and hence not immediately
appealable)); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268 (1982) (similar disposi-
tion of vindictive prosecution claim)). The Flanagan Court declined to apply the collateral order
doctrine more liberally than it had in the past, noting that "[t]he costs of such expansion are great,
and the potential rewards are small"; moreover, interruptions of trial in criminal cases "exact[ ] a
presumptively prohibitive price." Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
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doctrine; the courts could effectively review prosecutorial misconduct af-
ter a conviction, dismissing the tainted indictment then if necessary.63
After Mechanik, however, the prospect that a conviction might now
render grand jury orders "effectively unreviewable" on appeal has forced
some courts to reconsider the reviewability of such orders prior to con-
viction and sentencing.
B. Interlocutory Appeal of Grand Jury Error After Mechanik.
Dissenting vigorously in Mechanik, Justice Marshall remarked that
the Court's holding might cause denials of Rule 6(d) motions to dismiss
to fall within the collateral order doctrine. Assuming a district court's
order denying such a motion is separable from the merits of the prosecu-
tion, as well as final, Mechanik would supply the third element of the
doctrine by rendering the order "wholly unreviewable." 64 Courts that
construe Mechanik as foreclosing postconviction review of orders deny-
ing motions to dismiss for grand jury error have nevertheless disagreed
whether such motions are appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit applies Mechanik broadly and, using an analysis simi-
lar to that suggested by Justice Marshall, 65 now allows interlocutory ap-
peal of these motions. Other courts have held interlocutory appeals to be
inappropriate despite the unavailability of subsequent review under
Mechanik 66
63. See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 391 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1983) (denial of motions
to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct held not appealable under collateral order doctrine); United
States v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 569 (9th Cir. 1981) (motion to dismiss because of grand jury irregu-
larities held not immediately appealable before trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); United States
v. Litman, 661 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1981) (denial of motion to dismiss not immediately appealable
since "collateral finality rule" not satisfied), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982); United States v.
Linton, 655 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1980) (appeal alleging prosecutorial misconduct dismissed), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1039 (3d Cir.
1980) (criteria for immediate appealability not met); United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 766 (9th
Cir. 1980) (interlocutory appeal denied since collateral order exception not met and grand jury pro-
ceedings reviewable and remediable after conviction), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); see also 15
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 55, § 3918 (Supp. 1988) (discussing requirement
of finality in criminal appeals). But cf. In re November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021, 1024-25
(7th Cir. 1980) (appeal from denial of evidentiary hearing allowed because meetings between current
prosecutor and former prosecutor whose conduct had resulted in dismissal of prior indictment in
same case presented danger of "unique" injury not remediable by future review).
64. Mechanik 475 U.S. at 81 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. In its decisions involving interlocutory appeal of grand jury orders, the Ninth Circuit has
not explicitly referred to Justice Marshall's Mechanik dissent. See United States v. Dederich, 825
F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Benjamin, 812 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. See United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v.
Kirk, No. 88-5660 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1988) (LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10244); United States v.
Daniels, 848 F.2d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d 250, 254
(1st Cir. 1987); cf United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1339 (10th Cir. 1986) (No "additional
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The following discussion addresses the Ninth Circuit's position and
then considers whether orders denying motions to dismiss for grand jury
irregularities are separable from the merits of a criminal action, as the
second part of the collateral order test requires. It then considers
whether, even if such orders are separable, pre-verdict review comports
with the Supreme Court's strict application of the final judgment rule in
criminal cases.
In United States v. Benjamin, 67 the Ninth Circuit stated its view that
Mechanik renders virtually all error involving prosecutorial grand jury
misconduct harmless. In that case, the district court had denied the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss their indictment for a violation of Rule
6(e)(2)'s secrecy provisions. 68 The Ninth Circuit allowed an appeal
under the collateral order doctrine.69
The court of appeals found the trial court's denial conclusive, sepa-
rate from the merits of the action, and, under Mechanik's application of
the harmless error rule, unreviewable after conviction. The court thus
held that the denial fell within the Cohen collateral order exception to
the finality requirement.70 The court also based its conclusion on the fact
that if it denied interlocutory review, the defendants would
wholly fail to benefit from the protections Rule 6(e) imposes on the
constitutionally-mandated grand jury process .... We cannot believe
that Congress and the Supreme Court intended such ineffectiveness for
the Rule. An interlocutory appeal will prevent that untoward result,
and § 1291 is to be given a "practical rather than a technical
exception to the final judgment rule has arisen from Mechanik, like Athena from the head of
Zeus.").
Several courts have skirted the issue of whether unreviewability under Mechanik would allow
interlocutory appeal of grand jury error, by interpreting the Supreme Court's decision as affiecting
only allegations of "technical" error or by exercising their supervisory powers. See infra notes 106-
58 and accompanying text.
67. 812 F.2d at 548.
68. Id. at 550. The Rule provides:
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise
provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except
in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a con-
tempt of court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). The Benjamin defendants alleged that the prosecution had caused disclo-
sure of grand jury records to a government witness who was involved in a civil action against the
defendants. Apparently, during his participation in the grand jury proceedings, the witness had
amended his civil complaint to include allegations similar to those in the indictment that the grand
jury subsequently returned. The prosecution then induced the district court to release grand jury
materials to the witness, without advising the court of the existence of the civil suit. Benjamin, 812
F.2d at 549-50.





In another Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Dederich,72 which
also involved an interlocutory appeal from a district court order in the
Benjamin trial, the government based its opposition to the appeal on Co-
hen's requirement of separability. The government argued that the logic
of Mechanik " 'inextricably link[s]' analysis of the grand jury's probable
cause determination to the sufficiency of evidence at trial."' 73 The court
conceded that in the context of a postconviction review, Mechanik would
require consideration of a jury verdict. It asserted, however, that
prosecutorial grand jury misconduct does not truly relate to the merits of
a criminal case and that "[flor purposes of the collateral order doctrine's
second requirement, it is enough that a decision by this court on the
present appeal will have no effect on the trial court's determination of
guilt or innocence under the present or any superseding indictment. '74
The court also found that under Mechanik, the error would be unreview-
able after conviction, as in Benjamin, and denied the government's mo-
tion to dismiss.
In light of Mechanik, then, the Ninth Circuit has allowed immediate
appeal from orders denying motions to dismiss indictments for
prosecutorial misconduct. 75 By doing so, the court has avoided
Mechanik's insulation of prosecutorial conduct before grand juries from
postconviction review. Cohen's requirement of separability, however,
might demand more rigorous analysis than the Ninth Circuit has con-
ducted. Moreover, other courts have rejected both Benjamin and Deder-
ich, classifying the Ninth Circuit decisions as impermissible applications
of the collateral order doctrine in the criminal context.76
Cohen's requirement of separability from the merits prevents "piece-
meal review of 'steps toward final judgment' " that will ultimately merge
in a court's final disposition of a case.77 A grand jury's determination of
71. Id. at 553-54 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949)).
72. 825 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 1320 (quoting Government Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction at 8).
74. Id.
75. Cf United States v. Tobias, 836 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In order to challenge the
denial of his motion ... [defendant] should have sought interlocutory review rather than appealing
after his conviction." (citing Benjamin)), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1299 (1988).
76. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
77. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 108 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (1988) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)) (denial of motion to dismiss civil com-




probable cause seems just such a step,78 especially since Mechanik subor-
dinates that determination to the trial jury's verdict. In addition, the
Supreme Court has recently required a showing of actual prejudice
before district courts may dismiss indictments for grand jury irregulari-
ties.79 As the Court has also observed, if a motion to dismiss requires a
showing of prejudice, then a court cannot fairly assess the merits of a
movant's allegations without knowing "the substance of the prosecu-
tion's and defendant's cases."' 80 Thus, an order denying such a motion
will not be sufficiently separate from the merits of the case to fall within
the collateral order doctrine. 8' The appellate courts, however, have
largely ignored Cohen's second requirement in the context of interlocu-
tory appeals alleging grand jury error, focusing instead on the propriety
of allowing such appeals at all.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was the
first to consider the Ninth Circuit's view of Mechanik, along with the
effect of Mechanik itself on pre-conviction appeals of grand jury error.
In United States v. LaRouche Campaign, the defendants had moved to
dismiss an indictment for various prosecutorial abuses before the grand
jury.82 The district court dismissed the motion.83 On appeal, the defend-
ants asserted that their "right to be tried only upon charges brought by
an unbiased, informed grand jury" would be irretrievably lost without
interlocutory review; therefore, they argued, the trial court's ruling fell
within the collateral order doctrine.8 4 The defendants advanced two
lines of reasoning to support this assertion: if the alleged error fell within
the ambit of Mechanik, the order would be unreviewable after convic-
78. Brief for Respondent at 20-21, Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, No. 87-1905 (U.S.
argued Jan. 17, 1989).
79. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988); see infra notes 142-49 and
accompanying text.
80. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1984).
81. Id. (disqualification of counsel in criminal trial not immediately appealable); see also Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 438-39 (1985) (Flanagan's prejudice/separability analy-
sis applies to disqualifications of counsel in civil cases).
82. 829 F.2d 250 (Ist Cir. 1987). The defendants alleged in part:
that the grand jury was used to investigate a pending indictment; that exculpatory evidence
had been withheld from the grand jury; that the prosecutor had asked questions before the
grand jury implying wrongdoing without any basis . . . ; that . . . the prosecutor had
accused a witness of lying [within the hearing of the grand jury]; that the indicting grand
jury may have been presented with excessive hearsay [and] misleading summaries of earlier
grand jury testimony[;] ... that the government had violated Fed.R.Cr.P. 6(e)(2)'s secrecy
provisions by disclosing impounded material to the press and public ... [; and that] the
government had engaged in a persistent and pervasive pattern of grand jury abuse designed
to compromise and undermine the impartiality of the grand jury in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id.




tion; alternatively, if Mechanik did not apply, the order was nevertheless
immediately appealable because post-trial review would come too late to
preserve their fifth amendment "right not to stand trial unless grand jury
proceedings are free of irregularities." ' s5
The LaRouche Campaign court quickly disposed of the defendants'
fifth amendment argument. As the court indicated, the defendants failed
to present support for the existence of such a "right not to be tried";
moreover, before Mechanik, the courts had conclusively rejected such
arguments.8 6 Turning to the possibility that Mechanik would foreclose
postconviction review, the court considered several aspects of the collat-
eral order doctrine: its requirement that the right at issue be "impor-
tant," the Supreme Court's strict application of the doctrine in the
criminal context, and the societal costs of piecemeal adjudication.8 7 Fo-
cusing on the requirement of importance, the court stated that "if the
defect (and its effect) in the grand jury proceeding is not significant
enough to warrant relief after conviction, we doubt that the alleged right
invaded by the defect is 'important' enough, within the meaning of Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., ... to call for an interlocutory ap-
peal."88 The court concluded that safeguards other than judicial review
are available to check prosecutorial misconduct and therefore dismissed
the interlocutory appeal. 89 The Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits have reached similar conclusions. 90
The historical treatment of the final judgment rule and the collateral
order doctrine in criminal contexts supports the First Circuit's approach.
The Supreme Court's recent reemphasis of the strictness of the finality
doctrine in criminal cases9' suggests that defendants seeking interlocu-
tory review must claim either a "right not to be tried" equal in magni-
tude to the rights conferred by the double jeopardy and speech or debate
clauses, or another right important enough to outweigh society's interest
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 923 (1981)). But cf United States v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317, 1321 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (Garner
consistent with allowing interlocutory appeal after Mechanik).
87. LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d at 254.
88. Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id.
90. See United States v. Poindexter, 859 F.2d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (expressly adopting
LaRouche Campaign court's position); United States v. Kirk, No. 88-5660 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1988)
(LEXIS, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10244) (citing LaRouche Campaign as additional support in hold-
ing that interlocutory appeals in criminal proceedings are "expressly" limited to appeals from deni-
als of motions to dismiss on double jeopardy and bail reduction grounds); United States v. Daniels,
848 F.2d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 1988) (adopting view similar to LaRouche Campaign court's).




"in the prompt administration of justice."'92 Although the LaRouche
Campaign court and like-minded courts have summarily dismissed asser-
tions of a right not to be tried, 93 some commentators have asserted that
such a right does exist.94 In light of the grand jury's historical function
as a shield of the innocent as well as a sword of the state,95 this view has
more than a "superficial attraction. '96 Yet, the Supreme Court's tradi-
tional treatment of grand jury irregularities does not support an inference
from the grand jury clause of a robust right not to be tried upon an in-
dictment "biased" by prosecutorial misconduct.
In Costello v. United States, for example, the Court severely limited
the scope of appellate review of challenges to the sufficiency of grand jury
evidence. 97 Since grand juries historically have not been subject to de-
manding evidentiary rules, an "indictment returned by a legally consti-
tuted and unbiased grand jury, . . if valid on its face, is enough to call
for trial of the charge on the merits."' 98 In order to avoid the implica-
tions of this strict language, some courts have found that prosecutorial
misconduct "biases" a grand jury such that its indictment is tainted even
under Costello.99 As Professor Beale and Deputy Solicitor General
Bryson note, however, the Costello Court, in mentioning bias as a factor,
most probably meant bias in the selection of grand jury members.' t°
Moreover, the Court's recent decision in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, discussed more fully below,101 drew a sharp distinction between
grand jury errors such as invidious discrimination in the selection of
grand jurors and other, arguably less suspect, errors-a distinction that
suggests that most errors are not "fundamental."10 2 Apparently, there-
fore, defects in grand jury proceedings do not implicate any right not to
92. Mechanik 475 U.S. at 70 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983)); see
supra notes 42-44, 58-62, and accompanying text.
93. See Daniels, 848 F.2d at 760; LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d at 252.
94. See, e.g., Curran & Margolius, supra note 26, at 29, col. 1.
95. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923
(1981).
97. 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (indictment based entirely on hearsay nevertheless valid); see 2 S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:20.
98. Costello, 350 U.S. at 363; cf United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (upholding
indictment based on illegally obtained evidence).
99. See supra note 90.
100. 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:22. Costello cites Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
'U.S. 354 (1939), a case mandating dismissal of indictments for violations of the equal protection
clause, when referring to the requirement of an unbiased grand jury. 350 U.S. at 363 n.7.
101. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
102. 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (1988); See Brief for Respondent at 23 & n.14, Midland Asphalt
Corp. v. United States, No. 87-1905 (U.S. argued Jan. 17, 1989).
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be tried. 10 3
Finally, allowing interlocutory appeal from denials of motions to
dismiss grand jury indictments would cause the collateral order excep-
tion to swallow the final judgment rule. Most defendants could make at
least a colorable claim of bias. 104 Thus, in light of the Supreme Court's
repeated emphasis on society's interest in speedy resolution of criminal
prosecutions, the collateral order doctrine seems an inappropriate means
of securing review of prosecutorial misconduct before federal grand
juries. 105
III. THE SCOPE OF MECHANIK
The courts of appeals have disagreed about Mechanik's effect on
claims that a prosecutor has committed more than "technical" transgres-
sions. Several courts have asserted that instances of prosecutorial mis-
conduct may be so flagrant or unfair that Mechanik would not require a
postconviction finding of harmless error. 10 6 For example, in United
103. United States v. Daniels, 848 F.2d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 1988). As the Daniels court noted,
"Hollywood Motor Car holds that objections to the procuring of an indictment may not be raised by
interlocutory appeal." Id. In drawing this conclusion, however, the Seventh Circuit ignored the
Hollywood Motor Car opinion's emphasis on the availability of review after conviction. See United
States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270 (1982).
104. E.g., United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 766 (9th Cir. 1980) ("In every criminal prose-
cution a defendant could make a motion to dismiss because of the type of evidence presented to the
grand jury ...."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); see also United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S.
850, 862 (1978) (denying interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss for violation of speedy
trial clause).
105. See Daniels, 848 F.2d at 760 ("Multiple appeals produce leaden-footed justice and divert
the time of courts from more pressing questions raised by other parties."); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 829 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1987):
[Slome of the very considerations underlying the Court's conclusion in Mechanik that the
societal costs of retrial after conviction were too substantial to justify setting aside a verdict
because of a Rule 6(d) violation in the grand jury proceedings are the same considerations
influencing the strictness with which the final judgment rule is applied in the criminal
context.
By contrast, allegations of double jeopardy and speech or debate clause violations, which may sup-
port an interlocutory appeal, seem to be self-limiting: only defendants previously put in jeopardy
and Members of Congress have standing to allege such claims. See Garner, 632 F.2d at 766 (distin-
guishing claims of prosecutorial grand jury misconduct from double jeopardy claims).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1988) (dictum) ("In our view,
Mechanik was not intended to preclude the postconviction review of assertions of errors that impli-
cate more than merely technical deficiencies."); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 832 (1st Cir.
1988) (dictum) ("[W]e recognize that there could be allegations of grand jury abuse so troubling as
to warrant an assessment, under Mechanik, of whether the 'societal interest in deterring the type of
abuses alleged' outweighed the 'societal costs of retrial'...." (quoting LaRouche Campaign, 829
F.2d at 253)); United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1986) ("We perceive that the
Court has drawn a distinction between a defendant's right not to stand accused except upon a finding
of probable cause and a broader right to fundamental fairness throughout the criminal process
.); cf Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 942 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e expressly do not decide
whether prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury setting is always rendered harmless by a petit
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States v. Taylor, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Mechanik does not
encompass prosecutorial misconduct that undermines the "fundamental
fairness" of the criminal system.10 7 The Taylor defendants sought pre-
conviction review of alleged grand jury error, arguing that Mechanik's
harmless error rule rendered the district court's denial of their motion to
dismiss unreviewable after a conviction and thus brought that ruling
within the collateral order doctrine.108 The court of appeals disagreed,
asserting that the Supreme Court's decision in Mechanik "was carefully
crafted along very narrow lines" and that it would not foreclose effective
review after conviction in the case at hand.l0 9
The Taylor court characterized the Rule 6(d) violation at issue in
Mechanik as "at worst,... technical, and, at most .... affect[ing] only
the grand jury's determination of probable cause"; thus, the violation did
not raise the question whether the prosecution was fundamentally un-
fair.'110 The court asserted that the Mechanik Court did not hold that a
Rule 6 violation or other misconduct affecting the fundamental fairness
of pretrial criminal proceedings was nonjusticiable after conviction."' It
concluded that the violations alleged by the Taylor defendants were not
merely technical, but implicated the defendants' right to fundamental
fairness in the criminal process. Since the issues went beyond the alleged
violations' impact on the grand jury's determination of probable cause, a
petit jury conviction would not render them moot; the court thus held
interlocutory appeal inappropriate. 12
jury's guilty verdict ...."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3195, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). But see United
States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir.) ("The [Mechanik] Court's reasoning... does not
depend upon the nature of the rule at hand ...."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988); United States
v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317, 1320 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (Under Mechanik, flagrant misconduct that
deceives a grand jury or compromises its independent judgment, and thus "would have justified the
district court in dismissing the indictment before trial, would go wholly unremedied if the district
court itself erred in denying dismissal." (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Benjamin, 812
F.2d 548, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1987)); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.5(h) (Supp. 1988)
(arguing that Mechanik's analysis would apply to indictment challenges based on most prosecutorial
abuses, including persistent or flagrant misconduct).
107. 798 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1986). The alleged misconduct included:
(1) invasion of the defense camp by the prosecution in violation of the attorney-client privi-
lege and defendants' Sixth Amendment rights; (2) abuse of the grand jury through
prosecutorial misconduct in the form of the prosecution's failure to present exculpatory
evidence and its biasing of the grand jury with inadmissible, inflammatory, and prejudicial
evidence; and (3) improper utilization of state officers in the grand jury investigation.
Id.
108. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Johns, the Third Circuit adopted the Taylor
court's reasoning and dismissed a similar interlocutory appeal of grand
jury error. 113 The First Circuit, too, has asserted that "there could be
allegations of grand jury abuse so troubling as to warrant an assessment,
under Mechanik, of whether the 'societal interest in deterring the type of
abuses alleged' outweighed the 'societal costs of retrial.' "1114
These courts, in asserting that indictments may be dismissed after
conviction, even in light of Mechanik, seem to be asserting their "super-
visory power" over the grand jury process. Although courts do not al-
ways explicitly state the basis for such postconviction review, their
concern with preserving fundamental fairness and punishing flagrant
abuses (always with a view to deterrence) suggests an aim to police, or
supervise, the integrity of the criminal process, rather than to redress
deprivations of rights in individual cases.' 5 As argued below, this ap-
proach clashes both with the Mechanik decision and with the limitations
on supervisory power articulated in recent Supreme Court decisions.
A. Mechanik's Inflexible Analysis.
The Mechanik Court's harmless error analysis and cost/benefit ap-
proach strongly suggest that its rule would apply even to allegations of
serious misconduct." 6 Justice Rehnquist's logic seems to address all
prosecutorial misconduct, regardless of its magnitude. As long as mis-
conduct is "sufficiently aimed at the grand jury's charging process,"'" 7
113. 858 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1988).
114. United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 832 (1st Cir.) (quoting United States v. LaRouche
Campaign, 829 F.2d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 117 (1988).
The First Circuit will not undertake such a balancing inquiry in all cases, however. In Bucci,
which involved a postconviction appeal, the appellant contested a grand jury's indictment, claiming
that it was based on unfairly prejudicial evidence and that the government had not disclosed that one
witness had committed pejury. Id. at 831. The court concluded that these allegations of abuse
warranted no assessment of competing interests to determine whether Mechanik's harmless error
rule should apply. Id. at 832.
115. See, e.g., Johns, 858 F.2d at 159-60 ("The grand jury abuses alleged... are different from
the violation that was at issue in Mechanik .... [They raise] the question of whether the govern-
ment violated the defendant's 'right to fundamental fairness'... [and] implicate issues that go to 'the
fundamental fairness of the criminal proceedings.'" (citations omitted)); United States v. Vest, 842
F.2d 1319, 1334 (1st Cir.) ("Even under Mechanik, the federal courts still have the responsibility to
supervise the government's use of its prosecutorial powers."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 489 (1988);
Bucci, 839 F.2d at 832 ("[W]e recognize that there could be allegations of grand jury abuse so
troubling as to warrant an assessment, under Mechanik of whether the 'societal interest in deterring
the type of abuse alleged' outweighed the 'societal costs of retrial'...."); United States v. Taylor,
798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[Defendants] are asserting that their right to fundamental
fairness has been adversely affected by the.., acts of which they complain.... [T]hese issues can be
raised upon appeal if the defendants are convicted.").
116. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.5(h) (Supp. 1988).
117. United States v. Benjamin, 812 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1987).
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and unless the error involves allegations of racial discrimination,'" 8
Mechanik will apply.
The Mechanik majority focused on the grand jury error at issue and
its relevance in light of the petit jury's verdict. 19 In its view, deprivation
of a fair trial process might justify reversal, "[b]ut the balance of interest
tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the out-
come of the trial."' 20 Thus, conviction conclusively determines the out-
come of the balancing analysis, completely overshadowing the issue of
pretrial fundamental fairness. Apparently, a court hearing a postconvic-
tion appeal may now consider "fairness" only with respect to the trial
itself. 121
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Benjamin, 122 has also broadly
construed Mechanik. The court reasoned that any difference between
the Rule 6(d) violation in Mechanik and the Rule 6(e) violation in Benja-
min would not foreclose application of Mechanik's harmless error rule
after conviction. The defendants' argument was "primarily one of taint,
or an improper effect on the grand jury's decision to indict"; 123 under
Mechanik, according to the Ninth Circuit, a guilty verdict erases any
prejudice from an improper grand jury charging decision. 124
The court applied the same reasoning in United States v. Deder-
118. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n.l (racial discrimination is so pernicious that it makes automatic
reversal necessary) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.5(h) (Supp. 1988) (noting that harmless error analysis does not apply to
racial discrimination in grand jury selection).
119. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70; see also id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court
shifts the focus of the harmless error analysis [after a verdict is returned] from an examination of the
violation's effect on the indictment to an assessment of the violation's effect on the trial verdict
120. Id. at 72.
121. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.5(h), at 81 (Supp. 1988) (footnotes
omitted):
The dismissal of an indictment in a postconviction setting conceivably could be distin-
guished when the trial of [sic] appellate court rested its ruling on the need to use its super-
visory power to control flagrant or persistent abuses of prosecutorial authority before the
grand jury .... [But] the language of the Mechanik opinion ... suggest[s] that such a
distinction would not be appealing to the Supreme Court . . . . Also, although the
Mechanik dissent clearly pointed out that the majority's ruling would leave enforcement of
Rule 6(d) to the "unreviewable largesse of the district court," the majority viewed that
consequence as an insufficient justification for adopting a contrary rule. It noted simply
that the "societal costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to
justify setting aside a verdict" on the basis of "an error [that] has had no effect on the
outcome of the trial."
122. 812 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 552. But see United States v. Midland Asphalt Corp., 840 F.2d 1040, 1046 (2d Cir.)
(Rule 6(e) protects interests very different from those that Rule 6(d) protects; thus, convictions will
not render Rule 6(e) violations harmless), cerL granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988) (No. 87-1905).
124. 812 F.2d at 553.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
ich, 125 even though that case involved allegations of misconduct more
serious than the Rule 6(e) violation at issue in Benjamin. According to
the Dederich defendants, the prosecutor had repeatedly forced witnesses
to assert their fifth amendment privilege, harassed witnesses associated
with the defense, failed to disclose evidence relating to witnesses' credi-
bility, presented false evidence, and misused the grand jury's subpoena
power. 126 These egregious abuses notwithstanding, the court of appeals
concluded that Mechanik would apply to the defendants' claims, and,
consequently, that conviction would moot those claims. 127 In the court's
view, even flagrant prosecutorial conduct that deceived a grand jury or
undermined its independence and "would have justified the district court
in dismissing the indictment before trial, would go wholly unremedied if
the district court itself erred in denying dismissal." 128
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a similarly broad view of
Mechanik in the context of postconviction appeals. In United States v.
Fountain, because of the defendant's conviction at trial, the court held
irrelevant his allegations that the prosecutor presented evidence of a re-
cantation later denied and hearsay evidence and failed to present excul-
patory evidence. 129 The court suggested that reversing the conviction
would have been "silly": the guilty verdict had removed the defendant
from the class of persons (i.e., the innocent) harmed by improperly ob-
tained indictments, and he could have been reindicted "in a trice" given
the trial record's availability to a new grand jury.130 The Fountain court
conceded that the Rule 6(d) violation in Mechanik was a "technicality,"
but observed that the decision's rationale applies to any rule designed to
protect the innocent from indictment: "we know, as surely as courts
'know' anything, that the convicted defendant is not a member of the
class of beneficiaries of [such a] rule."' 131
Under the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' reasoning, Mechanik rejects
the overturning of convictions as a means of deterring prosecutorial mis-
conduct. All types of misconduct that prejudice or bias a grand jury pose
the same danger as the Rule 6(d) violation in Mechanik: "that a defend-
ant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is no
probable cause to believe him guilty. 1 32 Mechanik thus seems to require
125. 825 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
126. Id. at 1319.
127. Id. at 1320.
128. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Benjamin, 812 F.2d at 553-54).
129. 840 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 533 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 515. As Judge Easterbrook, writing for the unanimous panel, also noted: "Most
important legal rules, even constitutional ones, may be enforced only by their beneficiaries." Id.
132. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
1263Vol. 1988:1242]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:1242
a finding of harmless error in virtually all postconviction appeals that
allege prosecutorial grand jury misconduct. 133 As the following section
discusses, other Supreme Court cases seem to support this position by
limiting the appellate courts' ability to "supervise" prosecutors' conduct
before grand juries.
B. Circumventing Harmless Error Analysis Through the Use of
Supervisory Power.
Supervisory power 134 provides courts with an attractive means for
avoiding the strictures that the Supreme Court has imposed on constitu-
tional challenges to grand jury indictments. 135 Prior to Mechanik, some
133. As a witness before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
has testified, "Justice Rehnquist's opinion contains dictum indicating that the ban on post-verdict
relief is nearly absolute, extending to 'any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the
charging decision.'" Hearings on HR. 1407, supra note 28, at 344 (statement of Henry Scott Wal-
lace, Legislative Director, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); see also 2 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.5(h) (Supp. 1988) (commenting on absolute nature of
Mechanik analysis).
Justice Rehnquist reserved an exception to Mechanik's harmless error rule: cases involving
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury or venire. The rationale behind this exception,
however, does not apply to any other kind of irregularity in grand jury proceedings. See Mechanik
475 U.S. at 70 n. 1; see also supra note 44.
134. The doctrine of supervisory power originated in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), in which the Supreme Court asserted a "supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts" that "implie[d] the duty of establishing and maintaining civi-
lized standards of procedure and evidence." Id. at 341, 340. "'[G]uided by considerations of jus-
tice'.., federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (quoting Mc-
Nabb, 318 U.S. at 341). The supervisory power exists "to implement a remedy for violation of
recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate
considerations validly before the jury; and, finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct."
Id (citations omitted).
135. 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:22(b); Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power
In Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM, L. REV. 1433, 1458-59 (1984). The fifth amendment guarantees the right to be tried only
upon indictment by a grand jury. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1960). Arguably,
therefore, a court may invalidate an indictment on constitutional grounds if the misconduct at issue
violates the defendant's rights under the due process or grand jury clauses. See, e.g., United States v.
Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 1985) (appearance before grand jury by United States Attorney,
who had previously represented suspects "with respect to the very same criminal activity which led
to the indictment that he ultimately helped to prosecute," violates due process), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing grand jury clause as basis for dismissal), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United
States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 (10th Cir. 1983) (due process clause as basis for dismissal); United
States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir.) (indictment on basis of immunized testimony vio-
lated defendant's rights under due process and grand jury clauses), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), the Supreme Court limited the scope ofsuch constitutional review of grand jury matters. See
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. In Costello, the Court implied that the grand jury should
remain independent of the courts as well as the executive. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 ("There is
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lower federal courts used their supervisory power to dismiss indictments
in an effort to safeguard grand juries' independence and impartiality from
prosecutorial misconduct. 136 These courts divided, however, over the
question whether dismissal requires a showing of actual prejudice to the
defendant. 137
every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like
its English progenitor[,] ... [which] acquired an independence ... free from control by the Crown or
judges.") As Beale and Bryson note, however, there is little basis for excepting supervisory power
decisions from these constitutional limitations. 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:22.
Moreover, some constitutional errors are subject to the harmless error doctrine. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); see also Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-12 (prosecutor's closing argu-
ment, commenting on defendants' silence concerning crimes, was rendered harmless beyond reason-
able doubt in light of "compelling case of guilt"); 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24,
§ 26.6(c)-(e). Others may infringe "rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 24, § 26.6(d) (analysis of conflict between harmless error and "automatic reversal" doc-
trines). Dictum in the Bank of Nova Scotia decision suggests, however, that only misconduct as
serious as racial or gender discrimination justifies such a presumption. Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (1988); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24,
§ 15.5(h) (Supp. 1988) (reading Mechanik in this way). Constitutional error subject to the harmless
error doctrine will be deemed harmless if it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the [trial] jury
would have returned a verdict of guilty" had the error not occurred. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-11;
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; see also 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 26.6(c) (describ-
ing cases).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Talbot, 825 F.2d 991, 998 n.5 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing cases in
which courts dismissed indictments under supervisory powers or on fifth amendment due process
grounds), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir.
1983) (using supervisory power to preserve jury's independence by dismissing indictment); Pino, 708
F.2d at 530 (indictment may be dismissed for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct that infringes on
grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816
(3d Cir. 1979) (given potential for abuse in grand jury proceedings, courts will use supervisory power
to regulate grand jury investigations); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (2d Cir. 1972)
(using supervisory power to dismiss indictment where hearsay misleadingly presented to grand jury).
Courts and commentators have disagreed on the propriety of using the courts' supervisory
power to dismiss indictments because of misconduct. See 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2,
§ 10:22(b) (noting controversy over whether supervisory power has same limits as constitutionally
based decisions and over requirement of prejudice to the defendant); B. GERSHMAN, supra note 10,
§ 2.2(b), at 2-8 to -9 (dismissals under supervisory power used to remedy prosecutorial misconduct,
preserve integrity of grand jury, and deter similar misconduct in future); Note, supra note 10, at
1088-92 (discussing circuit courts' divergence on whether indictment may be dismissed because of
prosecutorial misconduct in absence of grand jury prejudice). For a comprehensive critical discus-
sion of the federal courts' supervisory powers in criminal cases, see Beale, supra note 135.
A fundamental problem with such dismissals is that lower courts' supervisory-powers-based
regulation of prosecutorial conduct in the grand jury room appears to lack constitutional or statu-
tory authority. See id. at 1491-94. A bill entitled the Grand Jury Procedural Protection Act of
1987, H.R. 100-3308, supra note 28, would have provided a concrete source of authority for this sort
of regulation. See supra note 28.
137. See 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 10:22 & 91 n.71. Specifically, courts dis-
agreed whether prejudice is required in cases of persistent misconduct, 2 id. § 10:22, at 91, or of
statutory violations having an uncertain impact, such as the presence of unauthorized persons in the
grand jury room, cf United States v. Lill, 511 F. Supp. 50, 58-59 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (collecting and
distinguishing cases involving Rule 6(d) violations), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
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The Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, holding that dismissal for grand jury error gener-
ally requires a finding of actual prejudice to the defendant. 138 The dis-
trict court in Bank of Nova Scotia had dismissed an indictment because
the prosecutor's misconduct had destroyed the grand jury's indepen-
dence. 139 The district court had invoked its supervisory authority in or-
der to unequivocally declare the seriousness of such misconduct and the
court's refusal to tolerate it. 140 The Supreme Court held, however, that
courts may not avoid the harmless error rule by using supervisory
power. 14 1 According to the Court, indictments may be dismissed with-
out specific determinations of prejudice only in cases that involve mis-
conduct as fundamental as discrimination in the selection of grand
jurors. 142 Those cases represent not "isolated exceptions to the harmless
error rule," but "ones in which the structural protections of the grand
jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamen-
tally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice."' 143
As the Bank of Nova Scotia Court carefully noted, it did not decide
whether erosions of grand juries' independence or systematic abuse
would justify district courts in dismissing indictments pursuant to their
supervisory power. 44 Even if the Court had decided that such miscon-
duct justifies dismissal, that result would not have affected the harmless
error analysis under Mechanik. In a postconviction appeal, whether the
grand jury error at issue involves a pattern of abuse or is merely technical
has no bearing on the actual prejudice that a defendant has suffered, as-
sessed after his conviction by an untainted petit jury-the standard set by
Justice Rehnquist in Mechanilc Although egregious misconduct might
justify supervisory-power-based dismissal of an indictment at the trial
level, conviction would nevertheless render such misconduct harmless at
the appellate level.
Mechanik 735 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'd en banc per curiam, 756 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1985),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 24, § 15.6.
138. 108 S. Ct. at 2373.
139. United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1353 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456
(10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2369. The misconduct included
"numerous violations of Rule 6(d) and (e) .... violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, violations
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments .... knowing presentation of misinformation to the grand jury-
and mistreatment of [grand jury] witnesses." Id.
140. Id. at 1352-53 (prosecutors denied grand jury ability to "undertake its essential mission";
dismissal of indictment is thus warranted).
141. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2374.
142. Id. at 2375 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination); Ballard
v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (exclusion of women)); see also Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n.1,
cited in Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2375.
143. 108 S. Ct. at 2375 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 2376.
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One of the cases relied upon by the Bank of Nova Scotia Court dealt
specifically with the limits of an appellate court's supervisory power in
cases involving harmless error. In United States v. Hasting, the Supreme
Court held that a federal court of appeals may not avoid a harmless error
determination by relying on its supervisory power alone. 145 Although
the Seventh Circuit in Hasting did not state the basis for its holding, the
Supreme Court assumed that the court had acted pursuant to its supervi-
sory power and, as a result, reversed the circuit court's decision.1 46 As
the Supreme Court stated, "the interests preserved by the doctrine of
harmless error cannot be so lightly and casually ignored in order to chas-
tise what the [appellate] court viewed as prosecutorial overreaching."1 47
Thus, a defendant who alleges grand jury error in his appeal from a
valid conviction will have suffered no actual prejudice and thus will not
be entitled to a reversal. In short, the process will ultimately have pro-
duced a correct result in that defendant's case. Unless the misconduct at
issue involved something as serious as racial discrimination, reversal
would disobey the dictates of Bank of Nova Scotia and Hasting, as well as
the spirit of Mechanik As the Mechanik Court concluded, when an un-
tainted petit jury has found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interests
behind the harmless error rule outweigh any interests served by dismissal
of an indictment. 148 By reversing a conviction because of prosecutorial
grand jury misconduct, a court of appeals would compromise the balance
of interests that the Supreme Court has firmly established. This conclu-
sion, combined with the circuit courts" inability to review claims of such
misconduct on an interlocutory basis, means that the circuit courts have
no direct role in checking prosecutorial misconduct or in protecting
grand juries' independence.
145. 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
146. Id. at 505, 512. The Supreme Court noted that the Seventh Circuit was concerned with the
prosecutor's practice of commenting on defendants' silence at trial and inferred that the court,
"notwithstanding the harmless nature of the error,... acted in this case to discipline the prosecu-
tor-and warn other prosecutors." Id. at 504.
147. Id. at 507. After examining the record, the Hasting Court found the alleged error "harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 510, 512. The Court noted that the goals served by supervi-
sory powers do not control in cases involving harmless error: reversal by supervisory power is an
unnecessary remedy when a defendant would have been convicted anyway; moreover, concern for
the integrity of the process "carries less weight" when an error is truly harmless, presumably because
the process has ultimately yielded a correct result. Id. at 506. The Court also observed that deter-
rence through reversal is inappropriate when there are "more narrowly tailored" means to deter
misconduct, such as "directing the District Court to order the prosecutor to show cause why he
should not be disciplined, or by asking the Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding
against him. ... The Court also could have publicly chastised the prosecutor by identifying him in its
opinion." Id. at 506 & n.5 (citations omitted).
148. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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C. Errors Reviewable Even After Mechanik.
Even after Mechanik, however, appellate courts may still dismiss
indictments and reverse convictions when prosecutorial misconduct re-
suits in either a facially invalid indictment 149 or an unfair trial.150 For
example, United States v. Midland Asphalt Corp., 151 a case currently
before the Supreme Court, involves misconduct that implicates the fair-
ness of a trial, and thus illustrates the distinction between reviewable and
effectively unreviewable grand jury error.
In Midland Asphalt, the Second Circuit dismissed an interlocutory
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss for Rule 6(e) secrecy viola-
tions and other abuses. 152 The court reasoned that, because Rule 6(e)
protects interests essentially unrelated to findings of probable cause,
Mechanik would not require a finding of harmless error after conviction,
and the defendant's right to appellate review would remain. 5 3 The court
noted that the Rule's secrecy provisions protect society's important inter-
est in concealing the identities of grand jury witnesses and targets. In
addition, the Rule "safeguards the interests of society and of the defend-
ant in receiving a fair trial" by restricting the pretrial disclosure of poten-
tially prejudicial information. 154 In light of Rule 6(e)'s purpose, the
court concluded that, "unlike a violation of Rule 6(d), a violation of Rule
6(e) is not rendered harmless simply because the defendant is convicted;
at least in some instances, the more egregious the violation of Rule 6(e),
the more likely it becomes that the petit jury will convict."' 155
The Midland Asphalt court correctly suggested that conviction will
not necessarily moot a Rule 6(e) violation that damages a defendant's
interest in a fair trial. Prejudice resulting from grand jury error is to be
measured by the petit jury verdict, and if that verdict is itself tainted, it
cannot moot the grand jury error.'5 6 However, the Midland Asphalt
court inappropriately considered possible interests in grand jury secrecy,
apart from protecting petit juries from inflammatory publicity. After
149. See United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (conviction
did not render absence of essential element from indictment, which affected substantial right and was
necessary to give district court jurisdiction, harmless).
150. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 583 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Mechanik by its terms does
not bar reversal of a conviction when misconduct before the grand jury 'has deprived [the] defendant
of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.'" (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72)).
151. 840 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988) (No. 87-1905).
152. Id. at 1041.
153. Id. at 1046.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.; United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 583 (2d Cir. 1988).
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conviction, the interests at stake resemble those at stake in Mechanik, 157
and, as the Court decided in that case, the balance favors preserving con-
viction. As long as a defendant receives a fair trial, he cannot demon-
strate the prejudice required by Mechanik, and any erroneous refusal to
dismiss an indictment tainted by secrecy violations becomes harmless. 158
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF MECHANIK
"To say that a question may evade appellate review is not to say that
it will evade judicial review... ."159 Although Mechanik has eliminated
the circuit courts' role in redressing grand jury error, under Bank of
Nova Scotia a district court may still examine any grand jury error and
dismiss an indictment" 'if it is established that the violation substantially
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt'
that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such
violations."' 160 Reason exists, however, to question the effectiveness of
district court review of prosecutorial misconduct before grand juries.
In his Mechanik dissent, Justice Marshall noted several practical
impediments to full and fair review of motions to dismiss for grand jury
violations.' 6 1 Grand jury secrecy requirements make it difficult for a de-
fendant even to learn of improper prosecutorial conduct. 162 Moreover,
especially after Mechanik, district courts have an incentive to defer rul-
ing on motions to dismiss until after a jury reaches a verdict: if the de-
fendant is acquitted, the deferred motion becomes moot, and if he is
157. See Friedman, 854 F.2d at 582-83 (conviction moots effect of even pervasive or willful Rule
6(e) violations on grand jury's charging decision).
158. Since Midland, the Second Circuit seems to have recognized a distinction between allega-
tions that pretrial secrecy violations tainted a grand jury and allegations that such violations tainted
a petit jury. In Friedman, the court held that a conviction rendered an alleged Rule 6(e) violation
harmless, even though there was no allegation that the violation improperly affected the trial jury.
854 F.2d at 583-84; see supra note 150.
159. United States v. Daniels, 848 F.2d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 1988) (dismissing interlocutory appeal.
of grand jury error).
160. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (1988) (quoting Mechanik 475
U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
161. Mechanik 475 U.S. at 80-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii), a court may grant a defendant's request for disclo-
sure of grand jury records "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury." Courts, however, generally deny
such requests. 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 7:11. Although the necessary showing
may often require knowledge of the materials that a defendant seeks to have disclosed, Mechanik
475 U.S. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting), that possibility has not caused courts to view such motions
favorably. 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 7:11. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982), allows defendants access to a grand jury witness's statements after direct examination of that
witness at trial. Id. § 3500(b). See generally 2 S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 2, § 7:13. Such
disclosure is necessarily limited, however, and occurs only after commencement of trial. See
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 80-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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convicted, the grand jury error becomes harmless. 163 "The [Mechanik]
Court's decision thus offers busy district judges a new and unique way to
reduce their workload . .. .,164
Despite such practical obstacles to effective review by district courts,
the circuit courts' power to reverse convictions arguably remains unnec-
essary because "means more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable
prosecutorial conduct," such as contempt sanctions, recommendations
for professional discipline, and public chastisement, are available.1 6 "
Courts and commentators have noted, however, that
the constant flow of cases . . . involving prosecutorial misconduct
before petit juries demonstrates that judicial 'tongue clicking' and ad-
jurations to the 'better practice' are likely to have little impact ....
And while professional disciplinary sanctions may be available, ...
criminal defendants are unlikely to be in a position to initiate such
proceedings, or to see that they are pressed to a successful
conclusion. 166
Thus, in the wake of Mechanik and Bank of Nova Scotia, judicial
power to protect grand jury independence seems ineffective and inade-
quate, and these cases' elimination of judicial safeguards against
prosecutorial misconduct before grand juries is indeed troubling. How-
ever, reversing convictions to chastise and deter prosecutors visits high
costs on society, especially when a guilty defendant has received all the
protections of a fair trial. This dilemma suggests that protecting the
grand jury's screening function requires measures other than reversals of
convictions, at one extreme, and self-enforced prosecutorial guidelines, at
the other. By insulating grand jury abuse from judicial intervention, the
Supreme Court has left to Congress and the Department of Justice the
task of tailoring appropriate mechanisms to safeguard the grand jury's
traditional role as shield of the accused. 167
163. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 81 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at 81.
165. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 & n.5 (1983).
166. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United States v.
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant cannot attack improperly obtained in-
dictment on basis of prosecutor's nonadherence to United States Attorneys' Manual); UNITED
STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-1.100 (1985) (manual "is not intended to, does not, and may not
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter civil or criminal"); cf Hearings on H.R. 1407 supra note 28, at 313 (statement of Bernard S.
Bailor, Vice-Chairperson, ABA White Collar Crime Committee) (Rule 6 contempt sanction not
invoked in last 40 years).
167. Possible mechanisms might include establishment of a civil damages remedy or formal ad-




The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mechanik has
both highlighted and exacerbated the problems of judicial review of
prosecutorial grand jury misconduct. The terms of the Mechanik deci-
sion do not allow the lower courts to exclude errors involving "funda-
mental fairness" from the case's harmless error rule. Moreover, the
Court has greatly restricted the appellate courts' "supervisory power" to
reverse convictions as a means of deterring prosecutorial misconduct.
Interlocutory review is not a viable alternative to postconviction review,
given the Court's strict application of the collateral order doctrine in
criminal cases. Such review would also encourage defendants to raise
colorable but ultimately baseless claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
As those problems suggest, the courts cannot presently reconcile the
competing interests of the grand jury clause and the harmless error rule.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Mechanik and Bank of Nova
Scotia have thus left the protection of grand jury procedures to the legis-
lative and executive branches,
Christopher M, Arfaa
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